Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kenneth Yardley : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kenneth Yardley :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph E. Jackson; Cline, Jackson, Mayer & Benson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Don J. Hanson, A. Alma Nelson; Hanson & Garrett; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Truck Insurance Exchange v. Yardley, No. 914541.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3827
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
- H M SUPR£ M E COURT 
BR|£f 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
KENNETH YARDLEY, dba 
YARDLEY DAIRY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RECENT,,; 
)F THE Sd-ATE OP fa&W L l o <- \ 
1-JUN1977 
BRIGHG VO uf.Vt»lSiTY 
J. Rculc.i uo.!t LvV School 
Ctase No . 1 4 5 4 1 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF BEAVER COUNT]?, 
STATE OF UTAH 
HON. J. HARLAN BURNS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
HANSON {& GARRETT 
DON J. HANSON 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A. ALMA NELSON 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Re spoijident 
CLINE, JACKSON, MAYER & BENSON 
By Joseph E. Jackson, Esq. 
Cedar City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
AUG 2- 1976 
- Ckrk Supreme Court, Uich 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF 
THE TRIAL COURT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
JAMES COLE WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANT WHOSE 
INJURIES AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE SCOP|E OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT BY DEFENDANT 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THAT JAMES COLE'S INJURIES AROSEj OUT OF 
AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY 
DEFENDANT 
CONCLUSION 
Page 
25 
1 2 , 
1 9 , 
13 
1 2 , 
15 
2 0 , 
21 
13 
CASES CITED 
Barney v. Jewel Tea Company, 104 Utah 292, 
139 P. 2d 878 
Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 
196 P. 2d 502 (1948) 
Dalton v. Industrial Commission, 8 Utah 2d 353, 
334 P. 2d 763 (1959) 
Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P. 2d 809 
Foster v. Steed, 432 P. 2d 60, 19 Utah 2d 435 (1967) 
Geanakoules v. Union Portland Cement Company, 
41 Utah 486, 126 P. 329 (1912) " 24, 25 
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah 
2d , 538 P. 2d 316 (1975) 13, 18, 
19 
In re Ekker's Estate, 432 P. 2d 45, 19 Utah 2d 
414 (1967) 22 
Milbank Mutual Insurance Company v. Biss, 161 N.W. 
2d 622 (Minn. 1968) 25, 26 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430, 
274 P. 940 (1929) 12 
Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance Company, 5 Utah 
2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956) 12 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 
172 P. 2d 136 (1946) 14 
State By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 
27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P. 2d 817 (1972) 22 
Stone v. Hearst Lumber Company, 15 Utah 2d 49, 
386 P. 2d 910 (1963) 25 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 15 Utah 
2d 355, 393 P. 2d 391 (1964) 13 
Utah Fire Clay Company v. Industrial Commission, 
86 Utah 1, 40 P. 2d 183 (1935) 13 
Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P. 2d 702 
(1971) 22 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Annotation: 76 A.L.R. 2d 1215, Liability of 
Master for Injury or Death of Servant on 
Master's Premises Where Injury Occurred 
Outside Working Hours 
53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §182 
Restatement of Agency 2d, §220 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE *TATE OF UTAH 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a declaratory relief action brought by plaintiff, 
Truck Insurance Exchange, for a determination that defendant, 
Kenneth Yardley, is not afforded insurance coverage under a policy 
of irisuxianep issued by plaintiff for claims made against defendant 
by one James Cole, who was injured in an accident which occurred 
on January 25, 1973 at defendant's business premises, The only 
issue in dispute was whether James Cole was an employee of defendant 
whose injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURJT 
The case was t i:i ed before 3 udge H. Harlan Burns on 
April 22, 1975, On the assumption that evidence could be presented 
by defendant at trial to estab] i sh a quest ion of fact, plaintiff 
prior to trial requested a jury trial on whatever issues of fact 
may arise (R, 19), At the close of evidence plaintiff moved the 
Court to rule as a matter of 1 aw that James Cole was an employee 
of defendant whose injuries arose out of and in the course of his 
employment (Tr, 119-120). 
Following arguments by counsel for plaintiff and defendant 
which do not appear in the record, the Court found as a matter of 
law that James Cole was an employee of defendant in the course of 
his employment at the time James Cole was injured (Tr. 121-122 and 
R. 44-46). 
As to the effect of the employee status of James Cole 
upon the issue of coverage for defendant under defendant's policy 
with plaintiff for the claims by James Cole against defendant, 
the Court took the matter under advisement and allowed counsel 
for each party ten days to file a brief on the remaining issues 
of law. The briefs were filed and on February 3, 1976, the trial 
Court made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(R. 44-46) and judgment (R. 47-48) in favor of plaintiff. Defen-
dant appeals from the judgment of the Court in favor of plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to affirm the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and the judgment made and entered by 
the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 25, 1973, one James Cole was injured while 
operating machinery to unload grain from a truck owned by defen-
dant, Kenneth Yardley. Thereafter, Mr. Cole made claims against 
defendant for his injuries sustained in the accident. At the 
time of injury, defendant had coverage with plaintiff under an 
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insurance policy issued by plaintiff to defendant which afforded 
general liability coverage for defendant's dairy farm, together 
with automobile liability coverage (R. 3-5 and 7-9). The said 
insurance policy contained the following exclusion: 
This policy does not apply under; 
(5) Coverages A and G [bodily injury liability and 
medical payments coverage], except with respect 
to liability assumed by the insured under a 
contract ajs defined herein, to bodily injury 
or sickness, disease or death of any employee 
of the insured arising out of and in the course 
of his employment by the insured, other than a 
domestic employee whose injury arises out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of an auto-
mobile covered by this policy and for whose 
injury benefits in whole or in part are not 
payable or required to be paid under any 
workman's compensation law. [emphasis added] 
(Exhibit P-l at R. 36) 
Thus, the policy excluded coverage for claims made against the 
insured by an employee for injuries arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment by the insured. 
The only issue in dispute when the case came to trial was 
whether James Cole was an employee of defendant whose injuries 
arose out of and in the course of his employment by defendant 
under the terms of the policy (R. 3-5 and 7-9 and Tr. 119-122). 
The only witness called at the time of trial were James 
Cole and defendant Kenneth Yardley. Both witnesses were called 
by plaintiff and defendant called no witnesses on his behalf. 
James Cole testified that he was a retired truck driver. 
In his prior employment as a truck driver he drove moving vans for 
two companies (Tr. 4-5). After his retirement he drove a truck 
and did various odd jobs for various employers (Tr. 10-11). The 
odd jobs performed by Mr. Cole for the defendant and others were 
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to supplement his pension and Social Security income. He was not 
engaged in any business (Tr. 60). The jobs included driving a 
truck (Tr. 6), doing carpentry work as an assistant (Tr. 7), 
rounding up cattle (Tr. 8), feeding cattle (Tr. 9), mowing lawns 
and repairing leaky faucets (Tr. 10). He never advertised that 
he was an expert truck driver (Tr. 10) and he did not have an 
office (Tr. 11). 
Mr. Cole started working for defendcint, Kenneth Yardley, 
in the fall of 1972, at which time defendant hired him to drive 
one of defendant's trucks to haul silage to defendant's farm. 
Defendant made the arrangements for purchase of the silage, told 
Mr. Cole the route to follow, and paid Mr. Cole $2.50 per hour 
(Tr. 11-17). Mr. Cole later built cupboards in defendant's house 
at the direction of defendant's wife. Defendant furnished the 
materials and defendant's wife told Mr. Cole how she wanted the 
cupboards built. Mr. Cole was paid $3.00 per hour for his labor 
(Tr. 17-19). Mr. Cole later assisted defendant in nailing boards 
to an existing shed. Defendant furnished the materials and tools, 
instructed Mr. Cole as to how he wanted the work performed, and 
paid Mr. Cole $2.50 per hour (Tr. 19-20). 
About one week to one month after Mr. Cole had hauled 
silage for defendant, defendant arranged for Mr. Cole to haul grain 
for defendant's dairy operation (Tr. 21). Defendant told Mr. Cole 
that he would like Mr. Cole to drive one of defendant's trucks to 
Venice, Utah, occasionally when defendant would request that he 
do so, to get grain and bring it to defendant's farm. The trip 
to Venice and back took about five hours and defendant agreed to 
-4-
pay Mr. Cole $15.00 per trip. Mr. Cole was paid about the same 
amount per hour to drive the truck to Venice and back as he had 
been paid for his assistance in working on defendant's shed 
(Tr. 61). The trip always took about the same amount of time, 
but it was sometimes one-half hour to one hour longer and some-
times one-half hour less. He "supposes" that the figure of $15.00 
per trip was obtained by figuring how many hours it would take to 
make the trip and specifying a particular amount per hour (Tr. 70). 
On each occasion when he drove defendant's truck to pick 
up grain, Mr. Cole received instructions from defendant on the day 
before or the day he picked up the grain (Tr. 24). When he 
received a call from defendant, Mr. Cole would go to defendant's 
place of business, get the truck, and drive to Venice. The truck 
was generally unloaded and ready to go when he arrived (Tr. 26). 
When the defendant said that he needed grain, Mr. Cole 
had to go to get the grain the next day (Tr. 62). He had no 
authority to have anyone else drive the defendant's truck in his 
stead (Tr. 63). His agreement with the defendant was not that he 
would obtain grain for the defendant and use his own method of 
doing it, using anyone else's truck or hiring anyone else to 
drive the truck (Tr. 63). The defendant controlled the truck and 
controlled when he went to Venice and when he came back (Tr. 64). 
The arrangements for purchase of the grain were made 
entirely between defendant and the person from whom defendant 
purchased the grain (Tr. 23). Mr. Cole always drove defendant's 
truck and defendant paid for gasoline and oil. Defendant would 
have paid for any repairs if any had been required (Tr. 23). 
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Mr, Cole always followed the same route and defendant told him the 
route to follow (Tr. 25). Mr. Cole always drove to Venice and 
came back on the same day. His job was to go to Venice and come 
directly back (Tr. 27). 
On one trip to pick up grain in Venice, Mr. Cole took his 
wife with him and left her in Richfield, Utah, to shop while he 
picked up grain. He had to go through Richfield to get to Venice 
and he did not go out of his way. Defendant told Mr. Cole to take 
his wife with him on that occasion (Tr. 47-48). Mr. Cole 
occasionally stopped en route to purchase eggs for himself and his 
neighbors (Tr. 48-49). He picked up the eggs along his route and 
he did not go out of his way to get them (Tr. 61-62). He would not 
have driven off his route without the defendant's permission. He 
felt that if he wanted to do anything with defendant's truck other 
than go to Venice and back, he would have to ask the defendant's 
permission (Tr. 62). 
Mr. Cole testified that he unloaded the truck one time 
prior to the day he was injured. The defendant told him to unload 
the truck on that occasion and he would not have done anything 
without the defendant's approval (Tr. 28). The defendant paid 
him $10.00 for his labor (Tr. 28). 
On the day before he was injured, Mr. Cole received a call 
from the defendant requesting that Mr. Cole get a load of grain. 
Mr. Cole went to the defendant's farm the following morning and 
saw that there was a little grain left in the corners of the truck. 
The defendant told Mr. Cole and John Cartwright, another individual 
who was working for the defendant, to empty the grain from the 
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t r u c k and makp t h e t r u n k read 1 ' fnr a l o i l nf f r n i i Mr II Mlm 
. -i c t A/I Lyti t b t i l l e d Lhe trucJs and Mr, i c l s t a r t e d t h e m a c h i n e r y 
t o r u n l o a d i n g t h e g r a i n . Mr. Cole was i n j u r e d i s he was working 
vi I h 1ln i i r i rhinni I i I In nil id in | l i t I MI I* Mi < ul< ' 
was d o i n g t h e same t h i n g he had done wher IJO u n l o a d e d t h e t r u c k 
on t h e p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n (Tr i 
l h e d e t e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he owns a row m i l k i n g o p e r a -
t i o n . In c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t o p e r a t i o n , he owns b a r n s , p q u i p n e n t , 
I T n I I i i i < i i oi i J 1
 i b) mies Lo ie t o r 
Lhe d e f e n d a n t (Tr . 7 5 l Uefendanl , h i s l - i t h e r , h i s w i f e , md 1 i s 
son Jo most of t h e work in t h e o p e r a t i o n h i t l< T n s n n i l ltT I i r 
Ii f j j e o p l e L lit 11 1 J 
The d e f e n d a n t h i r e d Mr, f o l e m t h e f a l l of 1972 fo h a u l 
v rn i 1 iqp f r h i n The Jefon i int p u i i n ] p $ nil |it i briar in 3 
t h e d e f e n d a n t f u r n i s h e d t h e t r u c k , g a s , and o i l (Tr , 7 8 - 7 9 ) . A f t e r 
t h e s i l a g e had been h a u l e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t o Ail*. I I I I ^ J H i . _ ^ 1 ^ I D 
1 m l I t u p b o a r d s t o i her and Lhe d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t when Mr, i .o le 
was h i r e d . The d e f e n d a n t p a i d f< r t h e lumber and p a i d Mr Cole 
tr r [l is 1 i h I j IK I p e i lie LtLendant f i id i l L c a r d s 
tc d e f e n d a n t ' s c a t t l e s h e d . He d i d n o t d i s c u s s wages when he a sked 
Mi c Colo tc licit- him ^ i t h the hp 1 but he u s m l l JMI I Mr 
J I l i e d e f e n d a n t l u i n i s h i d lit, l u m b e r , m a t e r i a l b , 
and n a i l s , Mr. Co le was m e r e l y an a s s i s t a n t (Tr . 8<J). 
The d e f e n d a n t u qui ir I | n u ' h d ^ e a IT u n ' " . . 
o p e r a t i o n from an i n d i v i d u a l in V e n i c e , U t a h . The defendan t ' :-. 1e 
t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of t h e i r a i n .* : - • .r -----
ni< i e \\ d in e a li f ji it lu j jlu< 1< J-1 g r a i n bt canie *- , . *«e u c i c n u a n t 
and his father drove to Venice to pick up the grain occasionally 
and Mr. Cole also picked up grain for the defendant occasionally 
when the defendant needed it (Tr. 82-83). 
Under defendant's arrangement with Mr. Cole, Mr. Cole used 
the defendant's truck to pick up the grain and defendant paid for 
the gasoline and repairs. Mr. Cole had no duty to maintain the 
truck. Mr. Cole's only job was to drive the truck to Venice, get 
the grain, put a tarp over it7 and return to the farm (Tr. 87). 
Each time the defendant needed grain, he would call Mr. 
Cole the night before and ask Mr. Cole if he could drive to Venice 
and pick up grain. He does not recall ever calling Mr. Cole when 
Mr. Cole was unavailable. If Mr. Cole had been unavailable, 
defendant would have asked his father to pick up the grain or 
defendant would have done so (Tr. 89-90). 
Mr. Cole had no authority to have anyone else drive the 
truck in his stead (Tr. 89). Mr. Cole did not have any right to 
determine what use to make of the truck when the defendant hired 
him to haul grain (Tr. 90). If Mr. Cole borrowed the truck for 
other purposes, he could use it for those purposes, but when the 
defendant told him to go after grain, he was supposed to get the 
grain and come back (Tr. 91). Defendant told Mr. Cole that he 
could stop in Richfield if his wife wanted to go shopping and he 
could stop and get eggs, but Mr. Cole understood that he was to 
return the same day that he left (Tr. 91). The shortest route to 
Venice from the defendant's farm is through Cove Fort, Utah, and 
he expected Mr. Cole to follow that route (Tr. 93). 
The defendant stated that if Mr. Cole did not comply with 
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On the day before the accident, the defendant called Mr. 
Cole a ] i\ I I: < .:.„> J n I liim In,: n e e d e d M,i , i'ole to get a load of g r a i n . M r . 
Cole reported to the defendant's farm the followinq morning 
(Tr. 95) Th, Inf "'ml.ii,1 
i f he would w a i t u n t i l the; u e f e n d a n t i i n i s n e c , t i e c e f e n d a n t w;uid. 
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-9-
t- ~ 
the machinery, but he wanted to be there to assist (Tr. 115)• 
Shortly thereafter he learned that Mr. Cole had been injured by 
the machinery (Tr. Ill). 
On the basis of the foregoing facts, and viewing them in 
the light most favorable to the defendant, the trial Court decided 
in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law and made and entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 3, 1976 
(Tr. 44-46). The trial Court found that on the date of the 
accident, James Cole was unloading grain from the defendant's truck 
for the purposes of preparing the vehicle so that he could fill the 
truck with grain from another location and take the grain to defen-
dant1 s place of business, under defendant's orders, supervision 
and control (Tr. 45). The Court further found that the injuries 
to James Cole arose out of and in the scope of his employment for 
the insured as other than a domestic employee, within the terms 
of the policy held by defendant with plaintiff (Tr. 45). Based 
upon these facts and the other findings of fact and conclusions 
of law by the Court set out in the record, the Court concluded 
that no coverage was afforded to defendant under the policy of 
insurance held by the plaintiff with defendant for the claim made 
by James Cole against defendant or for the lawsuit filed by James 
Cole against defendant (Tr. 3). 
Based upon the trial Court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, the trial Court entered a judgment on February 3, 
1976, by which it was ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant 
is afforded no coverage under his insurance policy with plaintiff 
for the claims made by James Cole against defendant or for the 
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-11-
in so ruling. 
The majority of the Utah cases concerning the issue of 
whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor 
consists of cases decided under the workman's compensation laws 
of the State of Utah. The cases consistently have held that the 
same tests apply under the workman's compensation laws that apply 
under the common law distinctions between employees and indepen-
dent contractors. See Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 7 3 Utah 
430, 274 P. 940 (1929), Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 
Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (1948) , Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance 
Company, 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093 (1956), and Foster v. Steed, 
432 P. 2d 60, 19 Utah 2d 435 (1967). Defendant-appellant has 
recognized this fact in his brief, and all or most of the cases 
cited therein are cases decided under the workman's compensation 
laws of the various states. 
The leading Utah case which sets forth the criteria to be 
applied in determining whether one acting for another is an 
employee or an independent contractor is Christean v. Industrial 
Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502 (1948) , which case adopts 
the general criteria for distinguishing between an employee and 
an independent contractor as are set forth in the Restatement of 
Agency, §220, with the exception of the test of whether or not 
the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business. 
The Court in Christean also held that the most important factor 
by far is the right which the master has to control the actions 
of the servant. If the master has the right of control, it is 
not material that he does not exercise that control. The Court 
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391 (1964), Dowsett v, Dowsett , 1 L6 Utah 12, ?\)'t P. 2d 809, Utah 
Fire Clay Company v, industrial Coromissio ri, 8 6 H M11 l „ 111 I"', -' 11 
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of Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P. 2d 
136 (1946) , contending that the Parkinson case "poses a very 
similar set of facts" to the present case. In Parkinson, 
defendant Molyneaux made arrangements with Parkinson, the 
receiver of Woolsulate, Inc., to haul coke to the company's plant. 
Molyneaux was to furnish his own truck and the gasoline and oil 
to operate it. He was. also required to keep the truck in repair 
at his own expense. He was to receive $2.50 per ton for the coke 
hauled to the Woolsulate plant from one location and $4.00 for 
coke hauled to the Woolsulate plant from another location. 
Parkinson told Molyneaux that Woolsulate needed about 
thirty-five tons of coke each week, but Molyneaux could haul all 
the coke he wanted to, as long as Woolsulate had room to store it. 
He was not required to haul the coke on any particular day or at 
any particular time and his only obligation was to haul a minimum 
of thirty-five tons of coke per week and to unload the coke where 
he was directed. Woolsulate did not have the right to tell 
Molyneaux how much to haul in each truckload, how to drive, or 
what route to take. Woolsulate had a bin into which Molyneaux 
normally dumped the coke, but if Molyneaux wanted to haul more 
coke in any particular week, he was allowed to dump his load in 
a separate stockpile. 
Molyneaux had purchased his truck in 1942, over two years 
prior to the time that he began hauling coke for Woolsulate and 
continually thereafter he engaged in the business of trucking for 
various individuals, always using his own truck under the same 
arrangements. The Court noted that "he was in the business of a 
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up except on the two occasions when it was necessary to remove 
grain from the truck before driving it. Mr. Cole also worked for 
defendant building cupboards, nailing boards, and hauling silage. 
He worked for others doing various farm chores, mowing lawns, 
driving their trucks, and doing whatever jobs were available. He 
never advertised that he was an expert truck driver. 
Mr. Cole was also subject to extensive supervision and 
control by defendant* Just as defendant had exercised nearly 
total supervision and control over the work performed by Mr. Cole 
in the other odd jobs performed by Mr. Cole for defendant, 
defendant exercised a very high degree of control over Mr. Cole 
in connection with the hauling of grain by Mr. Cole for defendant. 
The getting of grain for defendant's dairy cattle was a regular 
part of defendant's business. Defendant and his father often made 
the trip to get the grain and defendant also had Mr. Cole make 
the trip on frequent occasions. Each time he wanted Mr. Cole to 
make a trip to pick up grain, defendant would tell Mr. Cole that 
he wanted Mr. Cole to make the trip the following day. Mr. Cole 
was not free to make the trip whenever he wanted, but had to make 
the trip that day. Mr. Cole could only use defendant's truck. 
Mr. Cole had no authority to have anyone else drive the defendant's 
truck in his stead and he could not use his own method in obtaining 
the grain. The defendant controlled his truck and controlled when 
Mr. Cole went to Venice and when he came back. Defendant told Mr. 
Cole the route to follow. 
Although Mr. Cole took his wife with him on one trip to 
pick up grain and left her to shop in Richfield, Utah, while he 
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got the grain, he did not go out of his way and merely picked up 
his wife on his way back. Defendant told Mr. Cole to take his 
wife with him on that occasion. Although Mr. Cole occasionally 
stopped en route to purchase eggs for himself and his neighbors, 
there is no evidence that he had "a small egg-selling business" 
as defendant-appellant argues in his brief. There is no indica-
tion that he ever made any profit from the eggs he picked up. He 
picked up the eggs along his route and did not drive out of his 
way to get them. He would not have driven off his route without 
the defendant's permission. Mr. Cole felt that if he wanted to 
do anything with defendant's truck other than go to Venice and 
back, he would have to ask defendant's permission. 
Under the defendant's own testimony, Mr. Cole had no 
authority to allow anyone else to drive the truck in his stead 
and Mr. Cole did not have any right to determine what use to make 
of the truck. He expected Mr. Cole to follow the shortest route 
and told him the route to follow. If Mr. Cole did not comply 
with defendant's instructions, defendant would have had the power 
to fire Mr. Cole at any time. When the defendant sent Mr. Cole 
on a trip after grain, Mr. Cole did not have the authority to get 
coal or something else in the truck for himself or others. Mr. 
Cole was required to return the truck on the same day he left, 
although he could stop along the way for a short time if he 
wished to do so. 
In view of the numerous extensive controls which defendant 
exercised over Mr. Cole and the more numerous and extensive rights 
which defendant had to control the activities of Mr. Cole as 
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discussed herein and in the previous statement of facts, it is 
difficult to see how defendant-appellant can contend that James 
Cole was an independent contractor, having his own business and 
not subject to the control of defendant. The important factor to 
consider being the control or right of control by the master, 
there are very few situations in which the master could have more 
control over the actions of his servant than the defendant had over 
the actions of Mr. Cole as specified above. 
Defendant failed to obtain workman's compensation coverage 
or other insurance coverage for the employees in his business 
operation (Tr. 121), and he would now have the Court decide that 
in spite of his failure he should be covered for the loss under 
a general liability policy which specifically excludes coverage 
for employees injured during the course of their employment under 
which rates are set accordingly. Defendant exercised very exten-
sive control over the activities of James Cole and now asks the 
Court not to determine as a matter of law that James Cole was an 
employee of defendant. In that respect, this case is very similar 
to the case of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah 2d 
, 538 P. 2d 316 (1975), in which the Court stated that the 
employer wanted the "best of two possible worlds." The Court 
stated that the employer wanted: 
On the one hand, to have a person rendering a 
service over whom he can maintain a high degree 
of control; and at the same time give the 
person the status of an independent contractor 
to avoid the responsibilities he would have 
to an employee. 
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, supra, the 
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defendant drove a truck for the plaintiff under a contractual 
arrangement with plaintiff by which he would lease the plaintiff's 
truck and be paid on a per mile basis. He then received instruc-
tions from the plaintiff as to when and where to drive the truck. 
The defendant was injured while climbing on the truck to secure 
his load and he sought to obtain an award of workman's compensa-
tion on the basis that he was an employee of the plaintiff. The 
Court held that in spite of the efforts by plaintiff to disguise 
the true nature of the relationship, the defendant was an employee 
of the plaintiff. 
In the present case, unlike the Ashton case, the defendant 
did not even attempt to disguise the relationship of employer-
employee existing between defendant and James Cole prior to the 
accident upon which Mr. Cole based his claims against defendant. 
It was only after the injury that the defendant determined that 
it would be in his interest to establish that the relationship 
was not that of employer and employee. From the facts set out 
above, it is clear that the defendant had an almost total right 
to control the activities of James Cole and he exercised that 
right to a great extent. He should not be allowed now to have 
possessed that almost total control over Mr. Cole and yet, when 
it suits his purposes, have Mr. Cole considered by the courts 
as an independent contractor. 
A case which is very persuasive on the issue in question 
is Dalton v. Industrial Commission, 8 Utah 2d 353, 334 P. 2d 
763 (1959). In that case, the plaintiff was injured while trans-
porting an automobile from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah 
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for Wayne Rasmussen Company, a new and used car sales business. 
The company customarily used regular employees to transport the 
cars but charged the extra amounts which the employees were paid 
for transporting the cars to the cost of the cars. The company 
occasionally hired people who were not its regular employees to 
transport cars and charged the amounts paid to those persons to 
the cost of the cars in the same manner. A representative of the 
company approached the plaintiff and his brother and asked if they 
would like to transport cars from Rock Springs, Wyoming, to Utah. 
The representative said that the plaintiff and his brother would 
receive $25.00 for their services, out of which they were to pay 
their own bus fare of $5.00. All expenses for oil, gas or any 
emergency repairs were to be paid by the company. The Industrial 
Commission held that the plaintiff was not an employee of the 
company in transporting the car and the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the amount which the plaintiff received was compensa-
tion and wages and the plaintiff was an employee of the company. 
If the plaintiff in Dalton was considered to be an employee 
of the Wayne Rasmussen Company, surely the trial Court properly 
held as a matter of law that James Cole was an employee of defen-
dant at the time of the accident in which Mr. Cole was injured. 
In Dalton there is no indication that the amounts received by 
the plaintiff for his services had any relation to the time 
involved in performing those services. The plaintiff had not 
worked for the company previously and there was no indication 
that the transporting of the car was a continuation of previous 
work for the company. Most importantly, there was no indication 
-20-
that the company exercised the very high degree of control over 
the plaintiff in Dalton that the defendant exercised and had the 
right to exercise over Mr. Cole in the present case. As indicated 
previously, the defendant controlled or had a right to control 
virtually every activity by Mr. Cole during the time that Mr. 
Cole was using the defendant's truck to pick up grain and haul it 
to the defendant's farm. The defendant did not object if Mr. Cole 
made brief stops en route, but he demanded that Mr. Cole return 
with the truck the same day he took the truck. Mr. Cole was not 
free to use the truck in any manner he wished and in every other 
respect his activities were controlled by defendant. 
In view of this very extensive control, plaintiff-respondent 
respectfully submits that the evidence clearly supports the finding 
of the trial Court that reasonable minds could not differ on the 
question of whether James Cole was an employee of defendant whose 
injuries arose out of and in the scope of his employment by 
defendant, and the trial Court properly ruled as a matter of law 
that James Cole was such an employee. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THAT JAMES COLE'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF 
AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY 
DEFENDANT. 
Point II of the brief of defendant-appellant is difficult 
to understand but it appears to be contending that the trial Court 
improperly ruled that the injuries of James Cole arose out of and 
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in the scope of his employment for the insured (the defendant). 
The argument is based on semantics, in that the Court ruled at the 
time of trial, as a matter of law, that James Cole was an employee 
of defendant at the time he was injured (Tr,. 119-122) and the 
Court's findings of fact, based upon the Court's determination at 
trial, state that "the injuries of James Cole arose out of and in 
the scope of his employment for the insured as other than a 
domestic employee" (R. 45). In other words, the Court ruled on 
the existence of this fact in connection with its ruling that 
James Cole was an employee of defendant at the time he was injured, 
both as a matter of law. 
Even if there were any substance to the argument contained 
in Point II of appellant's brief, this Court should not consider 
the matter in that the issue is being raised for the first time 
on this appeal. The Utah Supreme Court consistently has held 
that it will not consider a matter raised for the first time on 
appeal. See State By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 
Utah 2d 295, 495 P. 2d 817 (1972), Wagner v. 01sen, 25 Utah 2d 
366, 482 P. 2d 702 (1971), and In re Ekker's Estate, 432 P. 2d 
45, 19 Utah 2d 414 (1967). 
When the Court ruled on the motion of plaintiff-respondent 
at the close of the evidence, it is apparent that the Court and 
the attorneys for the parties presumed that the decision was being 
made on the entire issue, i.e. whether James Cole was an employee 
of defendant whose injuries arose out of and in the scope of his 
employment (Tr. 119-124). It is further clear from the Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Court decided 
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the entire issue as a matter of law (R. 44-46). 
Defendant made no objection to the trial Court's findings 
in the Court below and never raised the issue at any time until 
this appeal. Following the trial Court's rulings at trial the 
defendant submitted a Memorandum of Points and Authorities to 
the Court on the remaining issues, as requested by the Court. 
The memorandum discusses the trial Court's ruling that James Cole 
was an employee of defendant, but the memorandum raises no other 
issues. Defendant made no objections to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted to the trial Court by plaintiff, 
either before or after the trial Court reviewed and signed the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant made no 
post-trial motions and never raised the issue until the defendant-
appellant's brief was filed with this Court.I 
If this Court were to accept the contentions made in 
Point II of defendant-appellant's brief, this Court would have to 
conclude that the issue cannot be considered by this Court on 
appeal, since the matter was never raised in the Court below. 
In any event, from a review of the evidence produced at 
trial it is clear that James Cole was within the scope of his 
employment with defendant at the time he was injured. The grain 
elevator which Mr. Cole was operating at the time he was injured 
belonged to the defendant, it was on defendant's business property, 
and Mr. Cole was using the elevator to remove grain from defen-
dant's truck so that Mr. Cole could use the truck to get more 
grain for defendant pursuant to defendant's instructions. Mr. 
Cole testified that defendant specifically told him to unload the 
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grain but defendant denied having told him to do so. Defendant 
testified, however, that Mr. Cole had unloaded the truck 
previously and knew how to operate the grain elevator. Defen-
dant had no objection to Mr. Cole operating the grain elevator 
but he wanted to be there to assist. 
Even if we assume that defendant had not instructed Mr. 
Cole to operate the grain elevator on that occasion, it is clear 
that Mr. Cole was operating within the scope of his employment. 
With respect to injuries sustained by an employee outside his 
actual working hours, 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §182, 
states: 
The master-servant relationship is not restricted 
to the employee's actual working hours but includes 
those times when the employee is on the employer's 
premises and engaged in the performance of his 
services or duties incidental thereto. Thus, the 
relationship may exist with respect to an employee 
on the premises of the employer while going to his 
work and may continue for a reasonable time after 
working hours for the purpose of allowing the 
servant sufficient time to leave the premises, or 
for so long as the employee is on the employer's 
premises, engaged in the actual or incidental 
duties of his employment, or subject to the 
employer's control.... 
The matter of scope of employment in those circumstances 
is covered in the annotation found at 7 6 A.L.R. 2d 1215, entitled 
Liability of Master for Injury or Death of Servant on Master's 
Premises Where Injury Occurred Outside Working Hours. The cases 
cited in the annotation make it clear that the injuries sustained 
by the employee may occur before or after his employment and he 
will still be considered within the scope of his employment. One 
of the cases cited in the annotation is Geanakoules v. Union 
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Portland Cement Company, 41 Utah 486, 126 P. 329 (1912). In 
Geanakoules the plaintiff came upon the defendant's premises to 
look for work. He talked to the foreman and the foreman said, 
"I'll give you a job; you can start with the whistle; take off 
your coat and start on your job." Before the plaintiff started 
to work he inquired about and was directed to the toilet. On his 
way to the toilet, he stepped on hot ashes and burned his foot, 
for which injuries he sued the defendant company. The Court held 
that the plaintiff was not a trespasser or a mere licensee, but 
rather an employee of defendant at the time <j>f the accident, even 
though he had not yet begun his employment. 
In another context, the Utah Supreme ^ourt has held that 
even a battery by an employee upon a customer of the employer may 
be considered within the scope of the employee's employment if it 
is committed in furtherance of the principal's interests. See 
Barney v. Jewel Tea Company, 104 Utah 292, 139 P. 2d 878, and 
Stone v. Hearst Lumber Company, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P. 2d 910 
(1963). Adopting the defendant's version of the facts in the 
present case, it is clear that James Cole was acting within the 
scope of his employment at the time he was injured. Defendant 
did not instruct the plaintiff not to unload the truck, the truck 
had to be unloaded in order to make it ready for another load of 
grain, Mr. Cole had unloaded the truck before and knew how to 
unload it, and defendant had no objection to Mr. Cole starting 
the machinery to unload the truck. 
A case particularly in point on this issue is Milbank 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Biss, 161 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1968). 
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In Biss, the insured had a policy very similar to the policy held 
by defendant with plaintiff in the present case which excluded 
coverage for liability of the insured for injuries to his 
employees arising out of and in the course of their employment. 
The insured operated a farm and hired the claimant and other boys 
to assist in harvesting grain. The claimant's compensation was 
not to begin until he started working in the grain field. While 
waiting for the machinery used in harvesting the grain to begin 
functioning, the claimant was sent to the insured's farmyard to 
prepare the grainery bin for receiving oats which were being 
harvested. On the way back from the grainery bin, the claimant 
fell out of the truck in which he was riding and was injured. 
The trial Court held that, based upon the facts presented, the 
claimant was not acting within the scope of his employment since 
he was not to receive compensation for the work he was performing 
and the work for which he was to receive compensation was totally 
unrelated and in a distant location from the work he was performing 
when he was injured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding as a 
matter of law that the claimant was acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident. 
If the claimant in Biss was acting within the scope of his 
employment, it is clear that James Cole was acting within the 
scope of his employment with defendant in the case at bar. Not 
only was Mr. Cole doing work preparatory to the work which he was 
required to perform for defendant, but he had done the work before, 
it was essential to his performing his duties as required by 
defendant and it involved the same equipment (the truck) which he 
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would be using in carrying out his employment with defendant. 
Therefore, it is clear that the trial Court properly found, as a 
matter of law, that James Cole was acting within the scope of his 
employment by defendant at the time he was iniured. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the cases, authorities, and analysis set 
forth above, the evidence presented at trial clearly supports the 
trial Court's finding, as a matter of law, that James Cole was an 
employee of defendant whose injuries arose omt of and in the scope 
of his employment by defendant. Point II of appellant's brief 
was not raised at any time in the lower Court prior to this 
appeal and, therefore, it should not be considered. If it were 
I 
considered, however, the evidence presented at trial clearly 
supported the trial Court's finding, as a matter of law, that 
the injuries sustained by James Cole arose out of and in the 
course of his employment by the defendant, plaintiff-respondent, 
therefore, respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the 
judgment made and entered by the trial Court, based upon the 
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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